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Consideration and subsequent passage of the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009 by the U.S. House of 
Representatives focused atten-
tion on whether agriculture would 
be helped or hurt by the policy’s 
objective of reducing U.S. green-
house gas emissions. Even though 
Collin Peterson, chairman of the 
House Agriculture Committee, 
sought and obtained changes to 
the legislation that were favorable 
to agriculture, many farm groups 
came out in opposition to the bill. 
One example is the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, which estimat-
ed that U.S. net farm income would 
decrease by at least $5 billion per 
year by 2020. Other farm groups 
supported the legislation, includ-
ing the National Wheat Growers 
Association, which found that the 
Peterson changes helped shape a 
policy that will “…ensure that agri-
culture has a place in any climate 
change legislation and that pro-
ducers are able to reap potential 
benefi ts rather than just accept 
coming costs.”
Whether agriculture will be a 
net winner or loser from climate 
change policy will depend on the 
details contained in any fi nal piece 
of legislation. But the sources of 
agricultural costs and benefi ts 
are well known, so it is possible 
to identify how agriculture could 
be affected. For example, to the 
extent that climate change policy 
leads to increased energy costs, 
farmers will have to pay more for 
diesel, electricity, fertilizer, and 
pesticides. The effects of these 
Costs and Benefi ts to Agriculture from Climate Change Policy
cost increases on production lev-
els and market prices will ultimate-
ly determine the extent to which 
farm income is negatively affected 
by higher energy costs. Another 
source of costs to agriculture 
would arise if agricultural emis-
sions of greenhouse gases were 
subject to a cap. Such a cap could 
force crop farmers and livestock 
producers to limit emissions of 
methane and nitrous oxide, much 
as the electricity-generating sector 
will have to meet a cap on carbon 
dioxide emissions. The House bill 
explicitly treats agriculture as an 
uncapped sector, and it is likely 
that the Senate will follow suit 
in any bill that they pass. In the 
House bill, a capped sector would 
be able to offset excess greenhouse 
gas emissions by buying emis-
sion reductions from uncapped 
sectors, such as agriculture. This 
possibility, of farmers selling emis-
sion credits, explains why there 
are supporters of climate change 
policy within agriculture. 
Why a Carbon Cap-and-Trade 
System Will Increase Farm 
Production Costs 
Currently, U.S. companies face no 
limits on their emissions of green-
house gases. A lack of any con-
straint means that U.S. industry has 
been able to choose manufacturing 
methods and technologies that min-
imize their costs without consider-
ation of their impact on atmospher-
ic greenhouse gas concentrations. 
In economic terms, greenhouse gas 
emissions have been external to the 
internal decision-making processes 
of companies. Having companies 
put a non-zero weight on emissions 
is the fi rst step in cutting emissions. 
The fairest policy would seem to 
be one that requires all companies to 
reduce their emissions by the same 
percentage. But economists have 
shown that such a uniform policy 
can greatly increase the total cost of 
meeting a target reduction. It makes 
more sense for companies that can 
most easily reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to do the greatest share of 
the cutting, thereby allowing other 
companies to continue to emit, as 
long as the overall target is met. 
Two policies can achieve effi -
cient emission reductions: a carbon 
tax and a cap-and-trade program. 
Under a carbon tax (or a carbon 
dioxide equivalent tax for nitrous 
oxide and methane), companies 
choose to either emit and pay the tax 
or cut emissions. A straightforward 
calculation will reveal the best alter-
native. Companies that can easily 
cut their emissions will do so. Those 
that cannot easily cut emissions will 
pay the tax. The tax is set at a level 
that increases the price of carbon 
enough to induce companies to  cut 
their emissions enough to meet the 
overall targeted reduction. 
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Under a cap-and-trade pro-
gram, overall emissions are capped. 
Companies are free to emit as much 
as they want as long as they have 
a permit for each ton of emissions. 
The trade part of the program al-
lows companies to buy and sell the 
permits. Those companies that can 
easily reduce emissions can make 
money by cutting their emissions 
and selling their excess permits. 
Companies that fi nd it too expensive 
to cut emissions can buy permits 
and continue to emit. 
The key for either policy option 
is to increase the price of emission, 
which automatically creates a profi t 
incentive for companies to fi gure out 
whether it is better to cut emissions 
or pay to emit. Thus, it doesn’t really 
matter which option is adopted. What 
does matter is increasing the cost of 
emitting greenhouse gases, which in 
turn will automatically increase the 
cost of producing those goods that 
currently result in large greenhouse 
gas emissions. The industries that 
are targeted by the House bill are 
electric utilities, oil refi ners, natural 
gas producers, and some manufactur-
ers that produce energy on site. This 
means that the price of electricity, 
gasoline, diesel fuel, home heating 
oil, and natural gas will increase. It 
naturally follows that products that 
rely heavily on these energy sources 
will also become more expensive. 
Although agriculture contrib-
utes about 6.7 percent of total U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions, it faces 
no future emissions cap under the 
House bill. This does not mean that 
agriculture will be unaffected by the 
cap-and-trade program in the energy 
sector. Higher energy costs will trans-
late directly into higher prices for 
electricity, propane, and diesel fuel, 
and domestically produced fertilizer 
and pesticides. The cost of produc-
ing fertilizer and pesticides in other 
countries will not be directly affected 
by U.S. legislation, but if other coun-
tries limit their greenhouse gas emis-
sions, then their production costs 
will also increase. 
Magnitude of Cost Increases
The amount by which farmers’ costs 
will increase depends on the quanti-
ties of energy-intensive inputs they 
use, the amount of fl exibility they 
have in moving away from more 
expensive inputs, and the price at 
which carbon settles. An example 
for Iowa corn and soybean produc-
tion illustrates an analysis of energy 
costs under cap and trade.
Iowa farmers who plant both 
corn and soybeans use approxi-
mately four gallons of diesel per 
acre to cultivate, plant, and harvest 
their crops. They also use about 
60 pounds of nitrogen fertilizer, 
50 pounds of phosphate, and 65 
pounds of potash across the two 
crops. And corn farmers typically 
use propane to dry their corn. 
The carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sion from using a gallon of diesel 
fuel is 10.1 kilograms. Thus, Iowa 
crop farmers emit about 40 kilo-
grams (0.04 metric tons) of CO2 per 
acre in diesel. If the price of CO2 is 
$20 per ton, then farmers will have 
to pay $0.80 per acre extra for their 
diesel fuel. 
Natural gas is the primary 
source of energy used to produce 
fertilizer. One source (Gellings and 
Parmenter, 2004) estimates that 
the energy used to produce, pack-
age, and transport different fertil-
izers is approximately 33,000 British 
thermal units (Btu) per pound for 
nitrogen, 7,000 Btu per pound for 
phosphate, and 5,500 Btu per pound 
for potash. Natural gas emits 117 
pounds of CO2 per million Btu. This 
adds up to about 0.14 tons of CO2 
per acre across corn and soybeans. 
At a price of $20 per ton of CO2, this 
amounts to $2.85 per acre. 
To dry a bushel of corn from 19 
percent moisture to 15 percent mois-
ture uses about 0.088 gallons of pro-
pane. With a yield of 180 bushels per 
acre, this amounts to 15.84 gallons 
of propane per acre for corn drying 
costs. Emission of CO2 from burning a 
gallon of propane is 5.525 kilograms. 
Thus, at a CO2 price of $20 per ton, 
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Adding up the extra costs 
from diesel, fertilizer, and 
propane at a price of $20 
per ton of CO2 results in a 
cost increase of $4.52 per 
acre for Iowa’s corn and 
soybean farmers. . .
Continued on page 11
propane costs would increase by $1.75 
per acre of corn, or by $0.87 per acre 
across corn and soybeans (assuming 
no drying costs for soybeans).
Adding up the extra costs from 
diesel, fertilizer, and propane at a 
price of $20 per ton of CO2 results 
in a cost increase of $4.52 per acre 
for Iowa’s corn and soybean farm-
ers, assuming that farmers make no 
adjustments to their operations. A 
different price for CO2 would change 
this cost estimate proportionately. 
To put a cost increase into perspec-
tive, the variable cost of producing 
corn and soybeans in Iowa in 2009 
is somewhere around $300 per acre. 
Thus even a $10.00 increase in the 
cost of production represents a 3.3 
percent increase. To add more con-
text to this increase, Iowa corn and 
soybean farmers receive approxi-
mately $20 per acre in direct pay-
ments as part of the 2008 farm bill. 
In addition, most farmers receive 
between $5.00 and $20.00 per acre 
in crop insurance subsidies. 
Livestock farmers would also 
be affected by energy cost increas-
es. According to livestock enter-
prise budgets put together by John 
Lawrence at Iowa State University, 
fuel, repairs, and utilities account 
for about 5 percent of total costs 
in swine when hogs are produced 
in confi nement. Thus a 20 percent 
increase in this cost category would 
increase Iowa’s average cost of pro-
ducing hogs by about 1 percent. 
Magnitude of Benefi ts from 
Agricultural Carbon Offsets
The price of emission permits in 
a cap-and-trade program will be 
determined by the cost of reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions from 
capped sectors of the economy, or 
by the cost and availability of offsets 
from uncapped sectors, such as agri-
culture. The Peterson amendment to 
the House bill identifi ed offset activi-
ties that agriculture could provide. 
Some of these include conservation 
tillage, reduced nitrous oxide emis-
sions caused by fertilizer use, in-
creased biomass sequestration from 
use of winter cover crops and re-
duced use of fallow, and reductions 
in methane emissions from livestock 
production. In addition, crop produc-
ers could convert their land from 
crop production to tree production.
 
Benefi t for Crops
Conservation tillage has been advo-
cated for years as a way to reduce 
costs and increase soil health. And 
it is now the rare farmer who does 
not try to keep tillage operations to a 
minimum. But adoption of no-till has 
stagnated. A widely used estimate of 
the annual amount by which soil car-
bon can be increased from adoption 
of no-till farming is one ton of CO2 
per hectare, or about 0.4 tons per 
acre. At a $20-per-ton carbon price, 
this amounts to $8.00 per acre.
The costs of no-till must help ex-
plain the stagnation in the number of 
farmers willing to adopt this method. 
Some of these costs in Iowa are the 
cost of a no-till planter, the perceived 
benefi t of fall tillage after corn to 
help break down the corn stover, 
and, for farmers who plant continu-
ous corn, the delay in planting and/
or germination caused by late-to-
warm soils. Despite these costs, a 
signifi cant number of farmers would 
likely move to no-till with an offer 
price of $8.00 per acre.
Farmers obtain large benefi ts 
from nitrogen fertilizer, and there 
is uncertainty about how to control 
nitrous oxide emissions from crop 
production. Therefore, the only 
prescription for low-cost reduc-
tion of nitrous oxide emissions is to 
increase the effi ciency with which 
nitrogen fertilizer is used. But this 
prescription holds true with or 
without energy policy incentives, 
particularly with the high fertil-
izer prices recently, so for now it is 
unclear how much crop farmers can 
benefi t by trying to reduce nitrous 
oxide emissions. 
According to the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, planting 
trees can sequester between two and 
nine tons of CO2 per year (see www.
epa.gov/sequestration/rates.html). In 
the Corn Belt, sequestration rates are 
about four tons per acre. At a price of 
$20 per ton, this can generate be-
tween $40 and $180 per acre per year 
($80 for Corn Belt land). Of course, 
to obtain this revenue, a farmer must 
quit growing crops and put up an in-
vestment to establish a forest. It is un-
likely that crop farmers on productive 
land will increase profi ts by swapping 
cropland for forests. Even if the CO2 
price were to double, the returns to 
growing crops would quickly rise if a 
lot of prime cropland were taken out 
of production and put into forests. 
It is more likely that owners of land 
that is more suitable for forests than 
crops will fi nd it worth their while to 
establish trees as a carbon offset. But 
most of this type of land has already 
been taken out of crops over the last 
30 years, so the amount of U.S. land 
that can be converted in response to 
the cap-and-trade policy is probably 
quite limited. 
Benefi ts for Livestock
Livestock producers can reduce 
methane emissions by covering 
their anaerobic lagoons or by in-
vesting in anaerobic digesters to 
stabilize their manure. Estimates of 
the reduction in methane emissions 
vary dramatically across types of 
operations and adopted mitigation 
technologies. There are examples of 





The debate over whether bio-fuels are good for the envi-ronment used to hinge on the 
credibility of studies published by 
David Pimentel, professor of ecology 
at Cornell University, who concluded 
that it took much more energy or 
fossil fuel to grow, transport, and 
process corn into ethanol than the 
ethanol could ever hope to replace 
as transportation fuel. A preponder-
ance of other studies on the issue 
found the data and methods used 
by Pimentel to be suspect, and most 
concluded that biofuels generally, 
and corn ethanol specifi cally, have 
a positive net energy balance, and 
their use as a replacement for gaso-
line leads to a reduction in green-
house gas emissions. 
The debate about whether bio-
fuels are a good thing now focuses 
squarely on whether their use causes 
too much conversion of natural lands 
into crop and livestock production 
around the world. The worry is that 
the loss of carbon stocks on the 
converted land would more than 
offset the direct reduction in green-
house gas emissions caused by lower 
gasoline use. The California Air Re-
sources Board (CARB) has concluded 
that corn ethanol causes such large 
amounts of land conversion that it 
does not qualify as a low-carbon fuel. 
In its recent analysis of greenhouse 
gas emissions from biofuels, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) estimates that corn ethanol 
and biodiesel made from soybean oil 
cause enough land-use changes to 
call into question whether these bio-
fuels meet required greenhouse gas 
reductions.
The debate over land-use chang-
es caused by biofuels has two main 
threads. The fi rst is a policy ques-
tion focusing on whether the United 
Measuring Unmeasurable Land-Use Changes from Biofuels
States should even account for 
land-use changes in other countries 
when considering greenhouse gas 
regulations of biofuels. The second 
is on the actual measurement of 
land-use changes and whether the 
models used by CARB and EPA are 
accurate enough to support regula-
tions that have billion-dollar conse-
quences on the biofuels industry. 
Most of the audience in the 
debate over measurement of the 
land-use impacts of biofuels has 
little understanding of the approach 
that is used by CARB and EPA to 
estimate land-use changes from bio-
fuels. Hence, it is diffi cult for most 
to judge whether the approach is 
accurate enough to justify its use. 
An overview of the procedures used 
to estimate indirect land use should 
help clarify the most important is-
sues involved.
Why Are Economists Doing 
the Measuring?
The three groups that have been 
most involved in estimating land-use 
changes from biofuels are econo-
mists at Iowa State University, Texas 
A&M University, and Purdue Uni-
versity (see the Editor’s note at the 
end of the article). Economists are 
involved because land-use changes 
from biofuels expansion is a re-
sponse by farmers and other land-
owners to a change in the supply of 
crops available to meet non-fuel de-
mands. The economic story for corn 
ethanol is as follows. Expansion of 
U.S. corn ethanol production increas-
es the demand for corn. This demand 
increase causes the market price of 
corn to rise. The increase in the price 
of corn causes U.S. farmers to grow 
more corn. Growing more U.S. corn 
can be done by increasing yields 
on existing land, by allocating more 
land to corn and less to other crops, 
and by creating more farmland. Cut-
ting acreage to other crops can lead 
to price increases for these crops 
also. Because agricultural commodi-
ties are traded worldwide, the price 
changes for corn and other crops 
seen in the United States will also be 
seen by farmers in other countries, 
thereby affecting their agricultural 
supplies. Those farmers around the 
world who see higher market prices 
will also increase yields, reallocate 
land among crops, and bring new 
land into production. 
Each step of this corn ethanol 
story requires an economist to esti-
mate the likely response of farmers, 
livestock producers, the food indus-
try, other industrial users of agricul-
tural commodities, and non-farming 
landowners to a change in market 
price. The key factors that infl uence 
how much land is converted to crop-
land include the following:
• Which crops will U.S. farmers 
decrease in response to higher 
corn prices?
• How much U.S. pasture and 
forest land will be converted to 
crops?
• How much will farmers in-
crease yields in response to 
price? 
• How much will prices, de-
mand, and production change 
in each important producing 
The debate about whether 
biofuels are a good thing 
now focuses squarely on 
whether their use causes 
too much conversion of 
natural lands into crop and 
livestock production 
around the world. 
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or consuming country in 
 response to a change in U.S. 
 production and exports?
Economists understand that 
the answers to each of these ques-
tions depend greatly on how much 
time passes before the response is 
measured. For example, a $1.00-per-
bushel increase in the price of corn 
will cause almost no U.S. land to be 
converted from pasture or forest to 
cropland after a single year. But a 
sustained $1.00-per-bushel increase 
for fi ve years will likely result in 
some land being converted. Similar-
ly, supply and demand in other coun-
tries will respond a great deal more 
after fi ve years than after one year. 
Economists also understand 
that the precision with which these 
responses can be measured de-
pends greatly on the quality and 
availability of data. We have a fairly 
good idea of the response of U.S. 
livestock producers to higher feed 
costs: given enough time, livestock 
supplies will be reduced, resulting 
in higher meat and dairy prices. 
But economists’ ability to estimate 
how Brazilian cattle ranchers will 
respond to the resulting increase 
in demand for Brazilian beef is less 
precise. The Brazilian cattle sector 
is simply less well understood than 
the U.S. livestock sector (even by 
Brazilian economists). The sector 
has had less scrutiny, and data mea-
suring its performance and struc-
ture is much less developed. 
More often than we want to 
admit, economists face situations 
in which we do not have adequate 
data to make precise estimates of 
the response of a sector to a price 
change. The backup strategy is to 
rely on economic theory to deter-
mine the direction of the response, 
and then to make a reasonable as-
sumption about the magnitude of the 
response. For example, as anybody 
who has taken Econ 101 knows, sup-
ply curves slope up. This means that 
the quantity supplied to the market 
will increase if market demand in-
creases. Thus, economists know that 
the Brazilian cattle herd will increase 
by some amount if U.S. meat supplies 
decrease. But an informed judgment 
about the magnitude of the change 
will rely on a trade economist looking 
at Brazilian trade policy to determine 
the extent to which a change in U.S. 
meat supplies will affect Brazilian 
prices. Then an experienced agricul-
tural economist will know something 
about the cattle cycle and estimate 
how long it might take for the Bra-
zilian cattle herd to respond to a 
price increase. A dedicated Brazilian 
agricultural economist with detailed 
knowledge of Brazilian environmen-
tal enforcement mechanisms will 
then make an estimate of the extent 
to which pasture can expand in fron-
tier forests. This estimate will then 
be linked with the cattle cycle and 
the price transmission to come up 
with an informed estimate of the tim-
ing and extent to which the Brazilian 
cattle herd will change in response to 
an increase in feed prices caused by 
biofuels expansion.
Most of the parameters used 
to capture supply and demand 
responses to price changes that 
populate the models economists use 
to estimate the impact of biofuels 
on land are based on less detailed 
knowledge than the given example 
assumes. Rather, estimates are based 
on previous work (the applicabil-
ity and quality of which is typically 
not addressed), insight of the ana-
lyst, and overall “reasonableness” 
with respect to the problem at hand. 
Economists need not apologize for 
constructing models in this manner: 
it simply is the only way to proceed 
because of a lack of data and special-
ized knowledge about agricultural 
and food systems around the world.
One implication of this reliance 
on a combination of theory and 
judgment is that it is quite diffi cult 
to construct confi dence intervals 
around model predictions. The dis-
tribution of most model parameters 
is not known because most are not 
estimated statistically. Furthermore, 
those parameters that are taken 
from the original studies in which 
they were estimated are generally 
not directly applicable to the new 
use for which they are being gath-
ered. Thus, there is no way that 
model predictions can be tested 
statistically. 
Modelers will conduct sensitiv-
ity analyses in recognition of the 
uncertainty underlying key model 
parameters. The parameters are 
varied from what might be consid-
ered reasonable lower and upper 
bounds on their values, and then 
model predictions over the param-
eter range are calculated. Although 
useful as a way to identify which 
model parameters are most impor-
tant in determining outcomes, this 
procedure cannot be represented 
as a statistical test of the model.
Why Model Predictions Will Not 
Be Consistent with History
One criticism of the models used by 
CARB and EPA to estimate indirect 
land use is that their predictions of 
land-use changes seem not to track 
with the actual changes in land use 
that we have observed in the last few 
years in response to sharply higher 
biofuels volumes. One might hope 
that the land-use changes we have 
seen could be used to validate or 
discredit the model predictions. For 
example, two recent studies (Tokgoz 
et al. 2007 and Hertel et al. 2009) 
of the impact of expanded biofuels 
on U.S. and world agriculture both 
estimate that expansion of corn 
ethanol would be accompanied by a 
large increase in corn production, a 
large decrease in soybean produc-
tion, and signifi cant decrease in corn 
and soybean exports. History differs 
from these predictions. Since 2005, 
corn ethanol has increased by about 
six billion gallons. Corn acreage has 
increased by about 6 percent, which 
is consistent with predictions. But 
soybean acreage has increased by 
more than 7 percent, corn exports 
are projected to be fl at in the 2009/10 
marketing year, and soybean ex-
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ports are projected to increase by 
more than 25 percent. The model 
predictions completely missed the 
large expansion in U.S. soybean 
production that has accompanied 
corn ethanol expansion and the abil-
ity of the United States to maintain 
or expand its exports of corn and 
soybeans. 
The problem with comparing 
actual outcomes with model predic-
tions is that they are not comparable. 
The impacts of biofuels are estimated 
by modelers relative to what their 
models predict will be the agricul-
tural situation under a baseline 
volume of biofuels, and under a set 
of assumptions about future mac-
roeconomic growth, growing condi-
tions, crop yields, exchange rates, 
and government policies. The models 
are then re-run with a higher biofuels 
volume and the same set of condi-
tioning assumptions. By subtracting 
the model results with higher biofuel 
volumes from the baseline model 
results, modelers hope to isolate the 
effects of biofuels expansion because 
all other factors that affect the agri-
cultural economy are held constant.
But of course, economic growth, 
weather, yields, exchange rates, and 
policies change every year. Thus, 
the projected agricultural situation 
will never line up with what actually 
occurs. The hope of modelers is that 
estimates of the change in produc-
tion and market prices caused by 
biofuels expansion relative to base-
line projections of production and 
prices are robust to changes in the 
conditioning assumptions. So even if 
the commodity boom and bust, the 
worldwide recession, and the major 
drought in Australia have moved 
agriculture away from its projected 
path, modelers assume that their 
estimated impact of biofuels on pro-
duction and prices remain valid. 
One advantage that model-
ers have is that their estimates are 
largely irrefutable because the world 
that they use to make their projec-
tions is never actually observed. For 
example, the expansion of U.S. soy-
bean acreage since 2005 would seem 
to refute model predictions about 
how U.S. farmers would adjust their 
acreage in response to expansion of 
corn ethanol. But we will never know 
because we cannot re-run history 
with lower ethanol volumes. If we 
could, it may well be that U.S. soy-
bean acreage would have been much 
larger than it actually was, in which 
case the model predictions would 
be correct. Because model predic-
tions cannot be refuted by past data, 
the credibility of models relies on 
submitting the models and results to 
peer review, being transparent about 
model assumptions and parameters, 
and putting in place a process by 
which the models refl ect the latest 
knowledge about agricultural and 
food systems.
New Uses for Agricultural Models
Perhaps economists’ greatest social 
contribution is their ability to an-
ticipate unintended consequences 
of seemingly good policy ideas. A 
classic unintended consequence is 
the market response of producers 
and consumers to a price change. 
When agricultural intervention is 
large enough to affect prices, then we 
must anticipate that there will be a 
response. And if the affected prices 
are for commodities that are traded, 
then some of the response will occur 
in other countries. The fact that the 
world will respond to a U.S. policy 
that diverts 30 percent of an expand-
ed U.S. corn crop from other uses to 
biofuels is not surprising. Predictions 
that expanded biofuels will cause 
expansion of cropland are not new. 
For example, in 1992, researchers at 
the Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development conducted a study on 
the implications of increased cellu-
losic biofuels production and con-
cluded that “higher crop prices in the 
biomass scenarios induce a conver-
sion of nonagricultural land to crop 
production” (Reese et al. 1992). 
What are new are legislative 
mandates to quantify the response of 
the world agricultural system to U.S. 
biofuels policy, with severe fi nan-
cial consequences for those biofuels 
having estimates of unintentional 
consequences deemed too great. The 
models that have been employed to 
estimate changes in domestic and 
international crop acreage have not 
traditionally been used in a regula-
tory context. Rather they have been 
used to give policymakers an idea of 
the likely consequences of changes 
in agricultural and trade policy. As 
a guide to policy development and 
understanding, these models have 
proved invaluable in facilitating pol-
icy agreements. The jury is still out 
on their use as a regulatory tool.
Economists know that agricul-
tural supply curves slope up and that 
expanded agricultural production 
will require some additional land. 
This means that expansion of U.S. 
biofuels will result in more land be-
ing devoted to crop production on an 
aggregate worldwide basis. How-
ever, given all the forces that affect 
agricultural production decisions, it 
is impossible to attribute any given 
agricultural development project to 
U.S. biofuels expansion, which is why 
CARB and EPA have to rely on mod-
els that attempt to isolate the effects 
of U.S. biofuels.
The fi nancial stakes involved in 
the estimation of land-use changes 
from biofuels have created a large 
incentive for interest groups to know 
more about the models and the ap-
proaches that are used. Those whose 
interests have been harmed by 
model estimates will have an incen-
tive to identify and change model 
assumptions and approaches that 
will serve their interests. Given the 
lack of data and detailed knowledge 
about exactly how the world’s pro-
ducers and consumers will respond 
to a change in U.S. policy, the models 
used to estimate land-use changes 
are populated with parameters that 
refl ect judgment calls, modeler in-
sights, and economic wisdom rather 
than hard data. Thus, these models, 
Continued on page 11







The recent sharp drop in com-modity prices has increased producer interest in the new 
farm bill program called ACRE 
(Average Crop Revenue Election). 
If the prices currently indicated by 
the futures markets for the 2009 
crop actually materialize, then 
corn, soybean, and wheat farm-
ers have a good chance of receiv-
ing substantial ACRE payments. 
Farmers have until August 14 to 
enroll in ACRE so there is still time 
for farmers to determine if ACRE 
is better for them than traditional 
farm programs. 
Farmers who sign up for ACRE 
are not eligible for countercycli-
cal payments, receive 20 percent 
lower direct payments, and receive 
a lower loan rate. Enrollment is 
through the 2012 crop year. Be-
cause payments from both ACRE 
and traditional farm programs de-
pend on the level of future prices 
and yields, it is impossible to say 
with certainty that one program 
or the other will generate more 
payments. However, looking at dif-
ferent yield and price scenarios 
can help farmers make a judgment 
about the odds that enrolling in 
ACRE will provide fruitful returns. 
A good place to begin is to look at 
the prices used to calculate the 
ACRE guarantees.
State Guarantees 
June USDA projections suggest 
that the prices used to set ACRE 
state guarantees for corn and 
soybeans will be $4.20/bu for corn 
and $10.05/bu for soybeans. The 
Odds of an ACRE Payment for Corn and Soybean Farmers
recent drop in prices may affect 
these prices by a small amount 
because the ACRE price is the av-
erage of the 2007/08 and 2008/09 
average price received by farmers, 
and the marketing year for corn 
and soybeans runs until August 31. 
Using future prices and historical 
basis, as of July 7, the expected av-
erage price for the 2009/10 market-
ing year is $3.25/bu for corn and 
$8.56/bu for corn. Because these 
market-indicated prices are so far 
below the ACRE prices, it looks like 
the odds are good that ACRE pay-
ments could be substantial. How-
ever, ACRE guarantees state rev-
enue, which is the product of state 
average yield per planted acre and 
the marketing year price. Thus, we 
must look at both price and yield 
to calculate the odds of a payment. 
A close look at the Iowa situation 
shows how this can be done.
The yield used to set the 2009 
ACRE state guarantees equals 
the average of the state average 
yield per planted acre from 2004 
through 2008 with the highest 
and lowest yields eliminated from 
the average. Table 1 provides the 
fi ve-year history for Iowa and the 
subsequent ACRE yield. 
The 2009 ACRE guarantees for 
Iowa equal 90 percent of the prod-
uct of the ACRE yield and the ACRE 
price. For corn this amounts to 
$650.16 per acre. For soybeans the 
state guarantee is $456.77 per acre. 
Farmers who sign up for ACRE will 
receive a payment if the product of 
the 2009 actual yield per planted 
acre and the 2009/10 season average 
price falls below these levels. The 
amount of the per acre payment is 
capped at 25 percent of these guar-
antees and the per acre payment 
is made on 83.3 percent of planted 
acres. Farm payments are calcu-
lated by multiplying the state ACRE 
payment by the ratio of farm yields 
to the ACRE yield. Total farm pay-
ments are also subject to a $65,000 
payment limit plus the 20 percent 
decrease in direct payments. If the 
farm is at the $40,000 direct pay-
ment limit, the effective ACRE pay-
ment limit is therefore $73,000.
Table 1. Data used to calculate Iowa ACRE yields
Source: Data are from the National Agricultural Statistics Service.
*Acres planted equals harvested acres plus failed acres as measured by the Farm 
 Service Agency (FSA).
**FSA rounds soybean yields to the nearest half bushel and corn yields to the 
 nearest bushel.
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Potential ACRE Payments
To see that ACRE has the potential 
to generate substantial payments, 
Figures 1 and 2 show what ACRE 
payments would be for alternative 
state average yields if the 2009/10 
marketing year prices turn out to be 
$3.25 for corn and $8.56 for soy-
beans. As shown, if yields are equal 
to the ACRE yield calculated in 
Table 1, then corn ACRE payments 
would be almost $75 per planted 
acre for corn and about $22 per 
acre for soybeans. These estimated 
payments account for payments 
being made on only 83.3 percent of 
planted acres. State average corn 
yields would have to exceed 200 
bu/ac to receive no ACRE payment 
with a $3.25 price. Soybean yields 
would have to exceed 54 bu/ac for 
ACRE payments to drop to zero 
with a price of $8.56. ACRE can gen-
erate a maximum of more than $135 
per acre for corn and $95 per acre 
for soybeans. 
A limitation in Figures 1 and 2 
is that they do not refl ect the prob-
ability of yield outcomes or uncer-
tainty about prices. An early July 
forecast of Iowa yields and national 
prices can provide an estimate of 
the odds of receiving an ACRE pay-
ment in 2009. Given the late signup 
date for ACRE, farmers can update 
these estimates in early August be-
fore making a fi nal decision. 
Calculating the Odds
As of the second week of July, Iowa 
crops are off to a great start, with 
82 percent of corn and 80 percent 
of soybeans rated good to excel-
lent. This is higher than any crop 
has been rated at this point in the 
growing season since 2003, when 
both crops received the same rat-
ing. Of course a good early-July crop 
rating does not guarantee a good 
crop. The 2003 soybean crop was a 
disaster because of a late drought 
and associated pest damage. And 
the state-average corn yield in 2003 
was 2.5 percent below trend. But a 
good rating in July does tilt the odds 
in favor of a good crop, particularly 
if soil moisture is plentiful, as it is 
this year.
Iowa trend yields per planted 
acre (with a linear trend from 1980 
to 2008) are 172 bu/ac for corn and 
49 bu/ac for soybeans. The largest 
trend-adjusted yield per planted 
acre for corn since 1980 is 193 bu/ac 
which occurred in 2004. For soy-
beans, 1994 was the best year, with 
a technology-adjusted yield of 57 bu/
ac. For corn, the probability of be-
low-trend yields is minimal because 
of the great start to the crop and 
abundant-to-surplus soil moisture 
throughout the state. So a reason-
able lower bound on yield may be 12 
bushels below trend yield for 2009, 
or 160 bu/ac. For soybeans, dry 
weather and an outbreak of pests in 
August could still cause problems, 
but it looks like El Niño conditions 
are returning, which, combined with 
abundant soil moisture, suggests 
that a repeat of 2003 is extremely 
unlikely. A reasonable lower bound 
on 2009 yields may be eight bushels 
below trend, or 40 bu/ac.
We can then construct a prob-
ability distribution of yields given 
Figure 1. ACRE payments to Iowa corn for various yields if price equals $3.25
Figure 2. ACRE payments to Iowa soybeans for various yields if price 
equals $8.56
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these upper and lower bounds if we 
set the expected yield for 2009 at 
180 bu/ac for corn and 53 bu/ac for 
soybeans. Figures 3 and 4 present 
the resulting probability distribution 
of Iowa corn and soybean yields for 
2009 as of the second week of July. 
The fi gures show the probability that 
2009 yields will be less than or equal 
to any yield on the horizontal axis. 
Thus, for example, there is a 10 per-
cent chance that Iowa corn yields will 
be less than 170 bu/ac, which means 
that there is a 90 percent chance that 
yields will be greater than 170 bu/ac. 
The next step is to fi gure out 
how much price uncertainty exists 
Figure 3. Probability distribution of 2009 Iowa corn yields
Figure 4. Probability distribution of 2009 Iowa soybean yields
in the market. We can fi nd this 
by looking at the price of put and 
call options on the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange. The price of a 
put option for December corn and 
November soybeans gives a good 
indication: the higher the price of 
the option, the greater the uncer-
tainty. And fi nally, the correlation 
between Iowa yields and the sea-
son-average price needs to be ac-
counted for. Market prices already 
refl ect the likelihood of a bumper 
crop for both corn and soybeans. 
If yields turn out to be lower than 
expected, prices will tend to be 
higher than current levels. If grow-
ing conditions improve even more, 
then we should see additional price 
weakness.
Combining the yield variability 
shown in Figures 3 and 4 and the 
price variability revealed by the 
price of put options with a reason-
able degree of negative correla-
tion results in the distribution of 
state revenue for Iowa corn and 
soybeans. These distributions are 
shown in Figures 5 and 6 on page 
10. The fi gures show the probability 
that state revenue will be less than 
or equal to any given level. They 
also show the revenue levels that 
will trigger ACRE payments. For 
corn, there is a 78 percent chance 
that Iowa farmers who sign up for 
ACRE will receive a payment. For 
soybeans, there is a 55 percent 
chance. Thus, the odds are good 
for both crops that ACRE will pay 
out in 2009.
With a bit more calculation, the 
data shown in Figures 5 and 6 can 
also be used to estimate the aver-
age size of the payment from ACRE. 
For corn, when ACRE pays out, 
the average payment is about $80. 
For soybeans, the average payout 
is $40 per acre. Multiplying these 
average payouts by the probability 
of a payout results in the overall ex-
pected or average payout. For corn, 
farmers should expect to see about 
$62 per planted acre. For soybeans, 
the expected payout is about $22 
per acre.
Iowa farmers must give up 20 
percent of their direct payments 
to participate in ACRE. Across 
corn and soybeans, this amounts 
to about $4.40 per planted acre. 
Weighting the corn and soybean 
expected ACRE payments by 2009 
planted acreage gives an overall ex-
pected ACRE payment across corn 
and soybeans for 2009 of $45, which 
is 10 times as large as what farmers 
are being asked to give up in direct 
payments. This suggests that the 
high odds of receiving an ACRE pay-
ment in 2009 can compensate farm-
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Figure 6. Distribution of Iowa soybean revenue
Figure 5. Distribution of Iowa corn revenue
ers for their loss in direct payments 
over the life of the farm bill.
What Should Farmers Do?
The signup rules for ACRE allow 
farmers to wait until August 14 to 
decide whether ACRE makes sense 
for them. By the fi rst week of August, 
farmers will have more information 
about 2009/10 marketing year prices, 
the condition of the 2009 crop, and 
fi nal ACRE guarantee levels. There-
fore, they will have more information 
about the potential size of ACRE pay-
ments. If corn prices stay in the low 
$3.00 range and soybean prices stay 
below $8.50, then ACRE becomes 
even more of a sure bet than is indi-
cated by the early July calculations. 
If for some reason corn and soybean 
prices increase dramatically and 
crop conditions do not deteriorate, 
then perhaps waiting until next year 
would be a better bet.
Producers who do not want to 
wait until August to enroll in ACRE 
can rest reassured that if market 
prices unexpectedly increase and no 
ACRE payment is triggered in 2009, 
this increase in market price will 
provide them with a high guarantee 
for their 2010 crops because the 2010 
guarantee will be based on market 
prices received in the 2008/09 and 
2009/10 marketing years. Odds are 
good that in at least one year over the 
next four, Iowa farmers will receive 
more in ACRE payments than they 
will give up in direct payments over 
the life of the farm bill. ◆
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dairy farms that produce the equiva-
lent of fi ve tons of CO2 reductions per 
year per cow. At a price of $20 per 
ton, this generates $100 per cow per 
year. Of course, any net benefi t or 
net cost of using and capturing the 
methane must be added or subtract-
ed from this $100. For comparison, 
the same cow may produce 20,000 
pounds of milk per year, which gener-
ates perhaps $1,000 per year in milk 
revenue in excess of feed costs at a 
milk price of $15 per hundredweight. 
Is Agriculture a Net Winner or 
Loser from a Carbon Cap-and- 
Trade Policy?
If the United States adopts a cap-
and-trade policy to combat climate 
change, the negative impacts on agri-
culture will likely be relatively small, 
particularly if agricultural emissions 
remain uncapped. Once companies 
Costs and Benefi ts to Agriculture from 
Climate Change Policy
Continued from page 3
here and abroad have a profi t incen-
tive to fi nd low-cost ways to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, it is 
doubtful that carbon dioxide prices 
will rise high enough to dramatically 
increase agricultural production 
costs. If other major agricultural pro-
ducers also face increasing produc-
tion costs because their countries 
adopt carbon-reducing policies, then 
U.S. producers will not lose their 
competitive advantage. Furthermore, 
if production costs do rise signifi cant-
ly, and if most of the world’s farmers 
face these higher production costs, 
then most, if not all, of the higher 
costs will soon be refl ected in higher 
commodity prices that will compen-
sate farmers for their higher costs. 
Similarly, the benefi ts from pro-
viding carbon offsets to capped sec-
tors of the economy will be modest as 
well. Benefi ts will accrue as more crop 
farmers will move to no-till farming, 
and a price for carbon will enhance 
the economics of methane recovery 
systems in livestock operations. 
Given the likelihood of modest 
costs and benefi ts from a cap-and-
trade system, perhaps agriculture 
should look at whether a cap-and-
trade policy will change growing 
conditions for the better or worse as 
a deciding factor in whether to sup-
port a change in policy. Given how 
much irrigated agriculture in the 
West relies on consistent mountain 
snowfall and Corn Belt agriculture 
relies on warm summers with abun-
dant rainfall, any disruptive change 
in climate will have a far greater 
impact on livelihoods than will the 
price of carbon. ◆
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like most economics models, are ripe 
ground for aggrieved parties. 
As we look to agriculture and for-
estry as a means of offsetting carbon 
at low cost, the demand for economic 
models of land use will increase. 
If greater investment in data and 
knowledge of agriculture around the 
world occurs, then the precision with 
which these models can estimate the 
impact of biofuels on the quantity of 
land brought into production, where 
the land-use expansion will occur, 
what the land will be planted to, and 
how the new lands will be managed 
will only improve. ◆
Editor’s Note
Researchers in the Center for Agri-
cultural and Rural Development at 
Iowa State University have worked 
for the last 18 months with EPA staff 
and other academic modelers at 
Texas A&M University and Purdue 
University to estimate the impacts 
on agriculture from expanded biofu-
els. EPA staff then used the results 
of this analysis in their life cycle as-
sessment of biofuels.
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